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Améry, Arendt, and the Future of the World 
Anne O’Byrne 
Stony Brook University 
Of all the terms Jean Améry might have chosen to explain the deepest effects 
of torture, the one he selected was world. To be tortured was to lose trust in 
the world, to become incapable of feeling at home in the world. In July 1943, 
Améry was arrested by the Gestapo in Belgium and tortured by the SS at the 
former fortress of Breendonk. With the first blow from the torturers, he 
famously wrote, one loses trust in the world. With that blow, one can no 
longer be certain that “by reason of written or unwritten social contracts the 
other person will spare me—and more precisely stated, that he will respect 
my physical, and with it also my metaphysical, being.”1 In a vault inside the 
fortress, beyond the reach of anyone who might help—a wife, a mother, a 
brother, a friend—it turned out that all social contracts had been broken and 
torture was possible. His attackers had no respect for him, and no-one else 
could or would help.2 
Already five years earlier he had had the experience of losing his 
world, the place where he was once at home. In March 1938, Nazi flags 
appeared throughout his native Austrian countryside and, even before he 
fled with his wife to France, he had lost the people, his people: “the 
schoolmate from the same bench, the neighbor, the teacher. They had 
become informers or bullies, at best, embarrassed opportunists.”3 He lost his 
language, and all the ties to meadows and hills, history and culture that hold 
together a world. A few years later, living in Belgium and working with a 
resistance group, he met a man who spoke in his familiar local dialect, and 
he was all but overwhelmed by a surging, intimate cordiality. He describes 
the experience of wanting to “address him in his, my language in order to 
then celebrate our regional patriotism and our reconciliation over a glass of 
wine.”4 But this was an SS man—off-duty, sleepy, merely complaining about 
noisy neighbors, but an SS man all the same. Améry writes: “At that 
moment I understood completely and forever that my home was enemy 
country and that the good comrade was sent here from the hostile homeland 
to wipe me out.”5 
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But what can we make of the fact that later, in the 1960s when he was 
in his 50s, Améry used the same thinking of home and world to give an 
account of ageing? In the essays “Stranger to Oneself” and “Not to 
Understand the World Any More,” it is not Nazi violence that bears down, 
setting us at odds with the world, but the hateful process of getting old. We 
experience it in our bodies, and in relation to the cultural life around us. We 
can no longer recognize ourselves in the mirror, and we can no longer 
understand the world that insists on changing around us. The world forges 
ahead, incomprehensibly, while our works and values become horribly old-
fashioned and another world in which they had meaning seems to have 
slipped away.  
 The key is in its forging ahead. Exploring Améry’s various invocations 
of the world and worlds—the world that lets him down in the experience of 
torture, the world he remembers in his state of exile, the world that makes 
itself strange to him as he grows older—turns up no way of answering this 
question. It is a catastrophe that the world should go on while your arms are 
being pulled from their sockets. It is an offense that the world of your 
childhood, the world that showed you who you were, should be destroyed 
or made alien to you. It horrifies us that the world becomes 
incomprehensible to us as we age. But we cannot understand these harms 
and the differences between them without understanding how worlds 
persist. Améry rejects a thinking that insists on the future, most explicitly 
Heidegger’s thought that we are essentially future-oriented beings. For 
Améry, finally, there was no future. Yet worlds go on, and they do so not 
exactly because our being is futural, but because it is generational. This will 
be my argument here. We come to be and pass away but, in between, some 
of us bring new beings into existence, and, deliberately or incidentally, all of 
us pass on to them something of the works and values to which we devote 
our lives. We are relational, and world is the name for the relations that make 
and sustain us generationally, even as they shift and change with the 
movement of generations. Améry and others mention the ghosts of the dead 
who haunt us, but the feeling of being haunted makes sense only given the 
attention we already give to our own generation and the new generation 
coming up. The dead want their due. Améry and others remind us that the 
body declines, but that has its full significance only in the context created by 
the fact that my body comes from someone else’s body, grows, changes, 
perhaps generates, changes some more, and declines even as others are born 
and grow, dying at last even as others continue to live.  
 Generational being sustains the world. This is the case for all worlds. It 
is the key to understanding what is the same and what is different about the 
three worldly experiences that Améry makes his themes: the shattering of 
the world he experienced in torture, the loss of world he underwent in exile, 
and the growing incomprehensibility of the world he experienced as he 
aged. It is a way to understand the genocidal harm to him, someone who 
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became a Jew in the face of antisemitism. Does it mean forcing Améry’s 
analysis to reckon with the future? Yes, it does. Does it mean forcing from 
the work of a writer famous for his relentless refusal to forgive a call for 
forgiveness, or insisting on finding in the darkness of his prose a flash of 
hope? No, it does not. The world goes on, for good or ill, and merely by 
going on it requires a response from us. Améry does not allow for such a 
requirement. I will argue that Hannah Arendt’s question from “The Crisis in 
Education” is the place of reckoning: Will we, the young and the old, take 
joint responsibility for the world?6 
 
World and worlds 
When a Chicago couple, Benjamin and Lala Gazul, went on a trip to Europe 
in 1939, they visited the Jewish ghetto in Warsaw. As they often did on 
vacation, they brought along their movie camera and recorded several 
minutes of life on the streets there. Today, anyone can watch the home 
movie they made.7 In it, men talk to one another on the street. A small child 
stands up from her chair. An elderly man can be seen sitting in an upper 
room. A vendor arranges spectacles on a makeshift stall. Some boys tease a 
ragged man carrying a large bundle. A group of men and boys stand 
together and stare into the camera for long seconds. Shockingly, the film is 
in color, and it takes a little while to grasp that this was August 1939. Within 
weeks, the streets would be in flames. Soon each of those boys laughing in 
the sunlight would surely be dead. This mix of grandparents, middle-aged 
people and children would be gone. Their world was about to end. The 
world in which we live is so much the worse for that. 
 We recognize it as a world because of what is familiar and what is 
strange. Leaving one’s home and talking to people on the street is a worldly 
thing to do. Anyone at all might show interest in a tourist with a fancy 
camera, or stoop to pick up a shopping bag, or even join in some casual 
cruelty to a ragged man, and here, in this time and place, it happens against 
a backdrop of signs written in Polish, in a street with a horse and cart 
passing. There are few women in view. Some bearded men wear long black 
coats. Others seem to be dressed for labour, and still others have starched 
collars and ties. That’s how they did things then, there in the vanished world 
we glimpse in the Gazuls’ film. We can understand it as a world because 
everything we see in it is a mode of being in the world.8  
 Améry speaks of his experience of exile mainly in terms of home, and 
of the alienation he experiences with the first blow from the policeman in 
terms of world, but the same structures are in place in each case. In one it is 
the loss of a world—one’s own world—and in the other it is the loss of the 
world. That is to say, his experience of exile might also be approached in 
terms of his world, the one in which he felt at home. After all, the essay 
“How Much Home Does A Person Need?” is not about home in Arendt’s 
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sense of the four walls that keep the outside world at bay, nor about real 
existing private homes where people live with their nearest kin and care for 
and love them, or loathe and hurt them, or engage in some happy/unhappy 
mixture of the two. Rather, it is about the feeling of being at home and the 
specific world—not the particular house—where that is possible. Home is 
security, Améry says.9 It is where we know we have a social place, as the 
successful china dealer from Bonn knew he had a place in his world; we 
know we belong to a culture, as the elderly, well-known poet belonged to 
German culture.10 Our world is meaningful. We know how to interpret the 
signs. It is where, as young Hans, Améry knew who he was. He was at ease 
in the traditional clothes he and everyone wore. He spoke dialect, had a 
familiar name, a group of friends, a culture.  
 A world is not a pre-set scene onto which the self arrives fully formed. 
Importantly, it not even an already accomplished backdrop against which 
the self gradually takes shape. Rather, we reconfigure the world by virtue of 
arriving into it, even as it gets to work on configuring us. It already consists 
of a set of signs being handed down, but we reorient them even as we 
receive that inheritance and learn to interpret those shared signs. It is a set of 
organic relations. Améry writes: “Just as one learns one’s mother tongue 
without knowing its grammar, one experiences one’s native surroundings. 
Mother tongue and native world grow with us, grow into us, and thus 
become the familiarity that guarantees us security.”11  
What happened, then, when the Nazi flags appeared on his neighbors’ 
farmhouses? His account of the loss comes in waves: he lost himself; his lost 
his world; that world died and was buried; worse again, perhaps it had 
never been his world at all. Améry never belonged to the world of a ghetto. 
Instead, his was made up of and by his Jewish family members and Catholic 
mother in their 20th century Austrian milieu. It was essential to it that this 
was a world in which his parents could be married, and in which having a 
Yiddish- or Hebrew-speaking great-grandfather was merely a mildly 
interesting piece of cultural genealogy. This is the world that had grown up 
with and in him and that he in turn sustained by his life there. But in 1938, 
the essential elements that kept him secure disappeared. He writes: “I was a 
person who could no longer say “we” and who therefore said “I” merely out 
of habit, but not with the feeling of full possession of myself.”12 Jill Stauffer 
observes that Améry experienced the harm of torture as both a loss of 
personal sovereignty and also despair of all help.13 In the same way here, 
exile meant both the destruction of his distinctive singular selfhood and the 
breaking of the specific social relationships on which he relied.  
The unfurling of a red, white and black flag marked the end of that 
world. Signals were crossed. Signs twisted themselves into new and 
unfamiliar shapes. Perhaps his neighbours experienced it as the beginning of 
something new that belonged to them more deeply than ever, or as an 
affirmation of their old world with its folk songs, woolen jackets, and 
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antisemitism that could now be professed in public. Yet this is four years 
before the first blow from the torturer. Even as his own world betrays him, 
surely he can still trust in the world. Even though he can no longer be 
Austrian, surely other places—France, Belgium—can shelter him. The 
Tyrolian SS man will never help him, but surely there are righteous people 
in all nations, and if a moment comes when his wife is herself in hiding, and 
mother and brother are far away, surely there will be a friend to come to his 
aid. And if things really are so bad that he can count on no passionate 
intervention by someone who intervenes for him and him alone, or for those 
of his kind, at the very least he can call on a minimally dutiful fellow human 
being. If he cannot be saved out of love, someone will surely save him out of 
respect for his humanity. No? 
No. As a cosmopolitanism, this conviction is not even second rate.14 It 
is simply an error. Améry lost trust in the world when the torturer’s blow 
showed that there was no contract to which we were all signatories by virtue 
of being human, and there was no universal human recognition of a 
person’s human dignity. As Améry discovered: “You are a human being 
only if you are a German, a Frenchman, a Christian, a member of whatever 
identifiable social group.”15 In the language I have been using, we can only 
call on the world from the midst of a world; we can only belong to the world 
by virtue of belonging to a world. As he sat in a Vienna café in 1935, reading 
of the Nuremberg Laws, he realized that the state across the border had 
made him a Jew by social and legal degree, and had simultaneously 
pronounced his death sentence. This is how he became a Jew. For three more 
years he would continue to be Austrian and his world would continue to 
protect him as such. After all, it was still his country, and it still had laws in 
place to guarantee his citizen rights. But, he writes, “a home ceases to be a 
home as soon as it is not at the same time also a fatherland.”16 Insofar as we 
understand fatherland as a state equipped with the power and laws to protect 
our rights, this is a position shared with Arendt. For her, human rights are a 
matter of empty talk, since the only enforceable rights are civil rights, 
granted and defended by states. Once it had become intolerable or 
impossible to be both Jewish and Austrian, Améry had no state. And insofar 
as we understand fatherland as patrie, a patrimony distinct from others and 
equipped with a mechanism for its own transmission, it approaches an 
Arendtian view of culture, where the works of our hands make up a world 
that will outlast any one of us, a shared world that will continue to have 
meaning even when we’re gone. 
Améry eventually acquired a state—he marvels at the ease with which 
he could then cross borders, now that his papers are in order—but none of 
the official homes available to him are quite a fatherland in the patrimonial 
sense. He carried a line of ancestors with him out of Austria, but could only 
think of them as cursed, homeless errants like himself. He could no longer 
be Austrian Hans, but that identity had been developed in that stage of life 
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when “one acquires a self” and so was irreplaceable, so he could not become 
Israeli Yochanan, nor easily sustain French-speaking Jean.17 Whichever one 
he chose, he would be obliged to continually cobble together a measure of 
worldliness, some sense of a world that might be his, in the face of his daily 
loss of trust in the world as such. He must proceed carefully, because he 
knows the precariousness of things. This is the deep bond to the despair his 
aging self feels in the face of a worldly culture that, after all, is merely doing 
what worlds do: change.  
 
The world’s passing 
The world and our distinctive worlds are not simply natural givens, either 
for Améry or for Arendt. Améry invokes the organic image of native 
growth, but he does so as he prepares us for understanding the violence of 
being “completely uprooted” by events that had nothing to do with nature;18 
Arendt reserves the term worldly for precisely those human-made objects 
that resist the natural cycle of labor and consumption. Neither would ever 
affirm givenness as a way of claiming that how we find things is how they 
ought to be. Yet there is something given about the world and our worlds, 
since we are not permitted to choose where we come to be, and with whom. 
Both Arendt and Améry were born into Jewish families, and each acquired a 
self in a world where it never occurred to them to deny it. They and their 
neighbors and classmates knew they were Jewish. The young Hannah 
discussed antisemitic incidents at school with her parents, and student Hans 
was proud of his scuffle with a Nazi protester, but those struggles were 
experienced as part of the back and forth of a community’s shared life and 
were no preparation for the moment when their worlds abruptly found their 
Jewishness intolerable. Those worlds had always acknowledged that they 
were Jewish, but now they forbade them to be anything else and marked 
them for destruction.  
The change was violent, sudden, unheard-of, unfair, and unjust, but in 
all other respects it was like each of the changes that happen every day as 
the world goes on. It is like all the tiny changes that led to A’s experience 
with her photo album in Améry’s “Not to Understand the World Any 
More.”19 A. is in her 50s and is thinking unhappily about the clothes she will 
get for the new season. They will be toned-down versions of the latest thing, 
but what she would really prefer is an outfit she remembers fondly from her 
youth. Yet when she takes out the album and studies the picture of her 
younger self, the clothes are ludicrous: a foolishly long skirt, odd shoulder 
pads, a silly-looking hat. She discovers both that “old-fashioned things are 
funny and embarrassing because they have been known for a long time and 
we were there when they were overtaken by time” and also that “the 
outmoded immediately loses any ridiculousness when it is no longer merely 
looked at but remembered.”20 A. looks at the photograph in the world of today, 
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and the image is a relic from another world that passed away bit by bit, 
season by season. But the memory of wearing those clothes places her back in 
that world, the world where she acquired her self, and, from that point of 
view, the fashionable dresses of today are the ones that seem grotesque. We 
are all exiles from youth in the same way that Améry became an exile from 
Austria, but the banal experience of aging happens in small, scarcely 
noticeable increments: the change of skirt lengths from one year to the next; 
the fall and rise in popularity of the memoir as a literary form; the young 
philosopher’s comment that nobody reads the Republic these days, it’s all 
about the Laws; the switch from phone calls to texts to tweets to swiping left 
and right. 
The changes may be jarring, but hardly violent. We all have the feeling 
that they sneak up on us, but we can’t quite claim that they are sudden. 
Untold generations have aged before us and tried to tell us about it, and the 
same thing happens to everyone who lives beyond youth. This is not a 
matter of justice. Everyone ages. But one can age badly or well, and “one 
ages badly in exile,” where alienation is piled upon alienation.21 The young 
exile has lost the past and must struggle to decipher a meaningful present, 
but who knows what is yet to come and what he will turn out to be? The 
future is his. Not so the one who is aging, exile or not: he is no more than 
who he is. For him, there is no future. 
This is the point where Améry’s attunement to the dynamic two-fold 
understanding of the self falters. Torture was experienced as a harm to 
sovereign self and the self who must call on others for help; exile was a loss 
of the singular self and the distinctive cultural and social relations that made 
it singular; age might be an intensification of self and a gesture towards 
what follows, but for Améry it is the loss of self and world. He is committed 
to the thought that one acquires a self in the midst of others, according to the 
various modes of being that make up one’s own distinctive world, but now 
it appears that the acquisition eventually comes to a halt, and always sooner 
than we would wish. Each of us when young starts off with a line of credit 
we granted ourselves, an advance which year by year is used up as we do 
this rather than that, become this rather than that until at last—though long 
before the end—we feel the onset of age and begin the realization that the 
credit is used up and this is who we are. We become deathly fixtures in a 
lively world that does not stop changing. Why does it change, relentlessly? 
Dwelling on the congealed selves of the aged allows Améry to turn away, 
disconsolate, from the fact that new beings enter the world all the time and 
that their very newness sustains the world. He knows that he received his 
language and his culture from those who came before and that he made it 
his own; he knows also that the generation that followed received their 
world and proceeded to make it their own too. Unable to confront the 
relation between those too, he is caught in what he experiences as “a loss of 
ego and world never to be replaced by anything or through any means.”22 
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The world of culture 
I lose ego, I lose world, and yet the world goes on.    
“Not To Understand the World Anymore” is an essay on getting 
culturally old. It is an essay about signs and time. For Améry, the sign system 
in which I come to be becomes my own individual system made up of the 
clothes, music, poems, theories, ways of being that first allowed me to make 
sense of my world. For a brief historical moment it coincides, more or less, 
with the dynamic supersystem that is the spirit of the age, and then begins 
to fall behind. The signs begin to change, new systems intervene and before 
long we face the choice of either setting up camp in our old, familiar world, 
intransigent and conservative, or trotting to keep up with what’s new. All 
the work that went into learning the old signs has been for naught, and all 
the work we’ll put into learning the new ones will never really pay off, since 
we will never again be “in.” There is no sense that all this might be a matter 
of the moral or cultural progress of humankind; instead, culture lurches 
forward, today’s supersystem destroying those of yesteryear and the year 
before, and overpowering all individual systems. We drop away. Améry 
writes: “Every withering away of a cultural sign system is death or the 
symbol of death. The imperative to die is witnessed by the aging. But right 
after it an imperative to become emerges, completely without them.”23  
Arendt writes about time and culture in the same era (“The Crisis in 
Culture” was written in 1960) but her approach initially seems to offer little 
help. For Arendt, culture is experienced in two ways, according to two 
modes of being in time. In one sense, our lives happen according to the 
cyclical rhythms of growth and decay, labor and consumption, and culture 
too may be the production of consumable objects that appear and then 
disappear according to the same cycles. This is mass culture, and to 
concentrate on it seems to compound rather than resolve Améry’s worries. 
Hollywood was her preferred example, but the fashion industry with which 
A. struggled would have worked even more effectively. The movie industry 
produces a new blockbuster, we all have fun watching it, and then forget 
about it as we look forward to the next one, due for release the next 
weekend. The fashion industry generates favored cuts and colors each 
season, we enjoy the glossy pictures and buying and wearing the new 
clothes, only to dispose of them as the next season arrives. We want a lot of 
movies and a lot of clothes, new ones every time, and for Arendt it is mass 
culture not only because so many of us enjoy it but because our huge 
appetite for it demands that it be served up in enormous quantities. In The 
Human Condition she regrets that the spirit of the time was reducing all 
human activity to some version of labor and consumption;24 here, in “The 
Crisis in Culture,” she sees the same spirit giving rise to an ephemeral 
culture that places no demands on us. Too busy consuming the stream of 
1 3 6  |  A m é r y ,  A r e n d t ,  a n d  t h e  F u t u r e  o f  t h e  W o r l d  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.791 
culture products, we are never expected to learn their history and methods, 
as Améry’s culturally educated person feels obliged to do, or to pause and 
evaluate the work, as Arendt wishes we would. To lapse into this mode of 
being in time may be quite pleasant, and may mean less anguish in the face 
of change and an acceptance of death as part of life, but for Améry, the 
sacrifice of worldliness is surely too high a price to pay.  
 This is certainly true of Arendt, who turns to a second temporality. In 
another sense, she argues, a human life cuts a straight line through the cycles 
of nature. This is not a line that leads from birth to death and beyond to a 
transcendent eternity. It is, rather, a worldly life, its escape from the natural 
cycle made possible by a world that can provide some resistance to 
consumption and decay, and that provides a site for meaning that will last 
longer than any one of us. This life, and the world through which it traces its 
line, may or may not form a segment in a great line of historical progress. In 
either case, it won’t last forever and it cannot offer immortality but, 
crucially, it allows us the possibility that something of us might stay, for a 
while. Perhaps what remains will be the work of our hands, as the Human 
Condition would have it, or perhaps, in the language of the culture essay, it is 
more important that it be the work of an artist, “the authentic producer of 
those objects which every civilization leaves behind as the quintessence and 
the lasting testimony of the spirit which animated it.” 
 Yet objects rarely preserve themselves. The earth sometimes gives up 
ancient pottery shards and carvings in which we recognize the work of 
human hands, but that discovery only ever marks the beginning. We have to 
study the orphaned objects for clues in order to reconstruct the world in 
which they had their first meaning, and it is difficult to know if this is the 
quintessence of a civilization or the detritus that happened to fall into a bog 
one day. If objects produced by humans are what constitute an enduring 
world, then we must understand object broadly and include institutions 
under that heading. This becomes clear in the moments in Arendt’s work 
when culture brushes against politics; what she has in mind as the sites of 
preservation and the bearers of lasting testimony are the institutions of 
public life. We build and must work to sustain institutions, which in turn 
protect and preserve the things we make in the face of the disposability of 
mass culture. My grandmother’s dresses are long gone, but the Costume 
Institute at the Metropolitan Museum of Art has clothes that are 700 years 
old; royal families preserve the robes and insignia of power over centuries; 
the Catholic Church owns textiles that date from the time of Christ. 
 The preservation of relics can only be part of the story, and not the 
most interesting part. It contributes the possibility of a future to Améry’s 
otherwise future-less scheme, but he would be less than compelled by the 
possibility of the artworks of his youth being included in a display of the 
curios of yesteryear. It is a deathly sort of future. Arendt’s more substantial 
contribution is her grasp of the imperative to die and the imperative to 
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become as simultaneous, overlapping, life-long commands. We are mortal 
but also natal beings, and the fulfillment of that finitude can only come in 
our mortal and natal—that is, generational—encounter with the world. 
Améry would agree that we each owe the world a death, but for Arendt this 
is inseparable from the fact that, by virtue of having been born, we also owe 
the world something of our natal newness.  
 
Responsibility for the world 
This generational dynamic is worked out most thoroughly in the essay “The 
Crisis in Education.” Education—what teachers do in schools, what parents 
do at home, what the older generation does in myriad ways—must rest on 
the acknowledgement that the world is constantly replenished by the arrival 
of new beings. Their newness means that they can do things their elders 
never imagined, and their energy will gather strength as that of their elders 
diminishes. What Améry experiences as demoralizing is also terrifying. 
How can the old ones bear to expose the world they have worked so hard to 
build and care for to the thoughtless, clueless power of a new generation? So 
we respond by insisting that education be conservative, precisely in order to 
protect the world. Yet the world belongs to the old precisely because of the 
work they did to develop and sustain it. If they give up the work now, as 
eventually they must, the edifices they erected in stone or in learning will 
soon be worn away by use, or will crumble thanks to the natural ravages of 
time and cultural amnesia. Any world, and all its objects and institutions, 
are made by us and so already exposed to forces of destruction. What will 
become of them unless they are renewed and rebuilt by those to come? Thus 
education must also be conservative in another way, protecting the natal 
creativity of the young from the constraints that the old will try to put on it.  
 We occupy the world together, and sustaining any world will 
necessarily be a joint effort among people born at different times. Learning is 
essential—education has to equip us with some knowledge of the world—
but way in which the young are inculcated into the shared body of worldly 
knowledge is informed by the question of responsibility above all. Arendt 
imagines a scene. A parent, disgusted at the state of the world, tells his 
children: 
In this world, even we are not very securely at home; how to move 
about in it, what to know, what skills to master, are mysteries to us 
too. You must try to make out as best you can; in any case you are 
not entitled to call us to account. We are innocent, and we wash our 
hands of you.25  
For Arendt, this would be an utter failure to take responsibility, 
understandable only if the speaker has failed to make the distinction 
between moral responsibility and worldly or political responsibility. The 
1 3 8  |  A m é r y ,  A r e n d t ,  a n d  t h e  F u t u r e  o f  t h e  W o r l d  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.791 
parent may be right: he did not make the world the way it is, and he is not 
the perpetrator of all or even any of the crimes against it. Yet the world 
presents itself as it is, in its givenness, and that is the call to which we must 
respond. We must become, we must die, and we must either take or take on 
the world as we find it. The times are always out of joint, and while Hamlet 
seems convinced that it is up to him alone to set them right, it is a human 
condition. Arendt encourages us to imagine a different scene:  
The educators here stand in relation to the young as representatives 
of a world for which they must assume responsibility although 
they themselves did not make it and even though they may, 
secretly or openly, wish it were other than it is.…Anyone who 
refuses to assume joint responsibility for the world should not have 
children and must not be allowed to take part in educating them.26  
The responsibility is broad and deep, and we should not be deceived by the 
joint nature of it. The non-reciprocal process of bequeathing the world and 
inheriting it is perilous, fraught with the dangers of stultification on the one 
hand and sheer destruction on the other. The interests of one generation will 
not be the same as those of the generation they generate. If the young are 
educated in awe of a glorious past, they will never come into their own; if 
they come of age with no understanding of the work of their forebears and 
no appreciation of their own power, they might ruin everything. In all her 
writing, Arendt is more concerned about the former than the latter. Without 
the power to start anew, there would never come a revolution. 
 After 1945, the world for which we are asked to take responsibility 
includes the exile, torture and death of millions, and also, as Améry 
piercingly puts it, the German revolution that did not happen.27 One strand 
of Arendt’s thinking invites us to let natal newness express itself in 
forgiveness and the creation of a new beginning in the world, but this is an 
invitation Améry could not possibly accept. However, another strand would 
carry us from the provocation of the-revolution-that-never-happened into 
the darkness of those twelve years, not in order to find sparks of hope but to 
understand how the human struggles of public, political life succumbed to 
the conviction that one group—the German people—could decide with 
whom they would share the world. 
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